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Abstract:  Miles et al. [1] recently produced an analysis of the costs and benefits of lockdown 
policies in the face of COVID-19, focussing on the case of the U.K.       They argue that the March-
June UK lockdown was more costly than the benefit of lives saved, if the latter are evaluated using 
the NICE threshold of £30000 for a quality-adjusted life year (QALY).      Looking forwards, they argue 
that the costs of a lockdown for 13 weeks from mid-June would be vastly greater than the benefits 
under any plausible QALY costing, even in a scenario in which easing lockdown led to a second 
infection wave that caused more than 7000 deaths a week by mid-September.      
 I note here two key problems that certainly significantly affect their estimates and cast doubt on 
their conclusions.     Firstly, they cut off their calculations arbitrarily after 13 weeks, without costing 
the epidemic state at the end of the period.    That is, they assume that we should be indifferent 
between mid-September states of 13 deaths a week and 7500 deaths a week, and corresponding 
infection rates.    This seems indefensible unless one assumes that (a) there will be no future vaccine 
and no future improvements in treatment or in non-medical interventions, (b) that COVID-19 will 
inevitably continue to propagate until herd immunity is reached.   Even under these assumptions it is 
very questionable.     Secondly, they ignore the costs of serious illness, possible long-term lowering 
of life quality, and possible lowering of life expectancy for COVID-19 survivors.     These are 
uncertain, but clearly not negligible, and plausibly comparable to or larger than the costs in lives lost.     
 
1. Introduction        
 
Many countries, including the U.K., have imposed temporary lockdowns in response to the COVID-19 
pandemic.    These have almost certainly saved lives, in the sense that fewer people have died from 
COVID-19 during and immediately after the lockdowns than would have done so in the absence of 
any government-mandated lockdown.     They may also have directly cost lives, in the sense that 
more people may have died or will die from some non-COVID causes than would otherwise have 
been the case.    They have also been extremely costly economically, and these costs translate into 
effective lives lost in various ways: for example, unemployment adversely affects quality of life and 
life expectancy, while lower government revenues and lower citizens’ incomes mean fewer 
resources for public and private health care.     None of these costs and benefits are easy to 
estimate, nor is there any consensus on how to compare health and death costs with monetary 
costs.       
In a recent preprint [1], Miles et al. bravely take on these challenges.    As they say, without 
estimates and some framework for comparing human lives and well-being with monetary costs, 
policy would be made in a vacuum.     The approach they take is to consider the costs of COVID-19 
deaths (or the benefits of lives saved by interventions) by estimating the quality-adjusted life years 
(QALYs) lost (or gained).    They then use one of the National Institute for Clinical Excellence 
guideline figures, according to which a treatment expected to increase life expectancy by one QALY 
should cost no more than £30000.   Taking this as the value of a QALY allows them to compare the 
medical benefits of interventions with their financial costs.  
Everything about this approach is debatable.     Some might argue that government decisions about 
dealing with pandemics or other disasters should not be guided by the same principles that are used 
in health care policy; that different values and criteria come into play.   Battling the pandemic has 
been widely compared to a war.    It would actually be very interesting to consider what QALY-based 
analyses would have said about the U.K.’s decisions to declare war in (for example) 1939 or 2003, 
but most people (then or now) probably would not think this is how the decisions should have been 
made.      
These large questions are beyond my scope here.    For the sake of discussion, I will accept Miles et 
al.’s overall approach as one plausible way of getting insight into the policy questions.     As Miles et 
al. note, arguments can be made for using different values for a QALY, and their calculations can be 
applied with any value (though of course the conclusions depend on the value chosen).     In fact, 
NICE themselves use a range of figures in different circumstances: their “end-of-life” guidance allows 
treatment expected to increase life expectancy by one QALY costing up to £50000, and they allow a 
threshold of up to £300000 per QALY for treating “very rare diseases” [2].      While COVID-19 is, alas, 
not a rare disease in the standard sense, one might interpret this larger threshold to reflect a 
societal wish for a particularly compassionate response in unusual circumstances -- such as, perhaps 
a global pandemic.    On the other hand, the larger threshold might be considered affordable only for 
very rare diseases precisely because of their rarity.  
I will in any case follow Miles et al. in using the NICE £30000 guideline as a primary reference point, 
while considering alternatives.     My focus is on two narrower questions: does it make sense to 
follow Miles et al. in considering costs and benefits over a fixed period (13 weeks), without taking 
the future consequences into account?  And is it justifiable to ignore the losses arising from COVID-
19 illness that does not result in death?   I argue that the answer to both questions is no, and hence 
that Miles et al.’s analyses are flawed and their conclusions unreliable.   
 
2. End States Matter: Why a raging epidemic in mid-September is not cost-free   
 
One does not have to dig deep into Ref. [1] to see a glaring problem with their analysis.    Their table 
4 sets out the deaths and corresponding (QALY-based) costs for a range of scenarios running over 13 
weeks from 12.6.20.   One is a continued full lockdown scenario, which they assume would reduce 
deaths and infections by a factor F = 0.7 per week, resulting in 13 deaths in week 13.     The others 
are three “unlocking scenarios”, in which restrictions are eased, resulting in the death rates 
multiplying by F = 0.9, 1.0 or 1.15 each week, so that they slowly diminish, stay constant, or increase 
over time.     The last of these gives a death rate of 7572 per week in week 13, close to the rate at 
the height of the U.K. epidemic in mid-April 2020.      Miles et al. calculate the total number of deaths 
over weeks 1-13 in each of the four scenarios, use these to estimate the costs of the easing scenarios 
in QALYs, and compare the resulting figures with the economic cost of continued full lockdown for 
the 13 weeks.       
The implication of this methodology is that we should be indifferent between the states we reach at 
the end of week 13 in the various scenarios, since Miles et al. assign no costs to any of them.    We 
should, in particular, be indifferent as to whether we reach mid-September in a state of near 
suppression, with 13 weekly deaths (and falling), and a raging epidemic, with 7572 weekly deaths 
(and rising).    We should care about the past costs – the deaths that have taken place – but ignore 
the future costs – the deaths that will predictably take place after mid-September as a consequence 
of the state at that time.      I beg to differ, and I suspect most economists, epidemiologists, 
policymakers and health care professionals also would.    The point is perhaps subtler than it seems 
at first sight, though, so it is worth considering various arguments: 
2.1 Good and bad reasons for caring about end states 
(1) A raging epidemic second wave would make the sacrifices of the earlier lockdown pointless.   
 
This sounds rhetorically forceful but is analytically unjustifiable.   The sacrifices of the earlier 
lockdown are sunk costs.    The lockdown may have been justified at the time because there 
was great uncertainty about the mortality and transmission rates of COVID-19, a real risk 
that an uncontrolled epidemic might lead to a complete collapse of the health care system, 
some hope that summer weather would reduce transmission enormously, or even 
conceivably because of some chance of a dramatic medical breakthrough early in the 
epidemic.      We now know more, and in hindsight it is possible, and in fact in line with Miles 
et al.’s analyses, that the March-June lockdown was indeed unjustified, in the sense that the 
economic costs of the lockdown were greater than the benefits in QALYs saved.      But in 
any case it is academic: we need to make future policies based on future costs and benefits, 
not on what they tell us about past policies.     
 
(2) For any given policy after mid-September, the death rates in subsequent weeks will be 
proportional to the death rates in week 13.      
 
This would be true in a model with just two parameters, D, the initial death rate per week, 
and F, the constant factor by which this rate changes.    In this model, the death rate in week 
N is 𝐷𝐷 𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁, and the total deaths after N weeks are 𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹 �𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁−1�(𝐹𝐹−1)  .      This is the model which 
Miles et al. use for a 13-week period, with 𝐷𝐷 = 1230 and various values of 𝐹𝐹.    Although 
obviously crude, it may be a reasonable way of setting out scenarios over this relatively 
short length of time.    But death rates obviously cannot grow exponentially indefinitely, 
since the UK population is finite.     After 39 weeks, with F = 1.15, this would give a 
cumulative total of 2,187,051 deaths, far more than the estimated total number of deaths if 
everyone in the UK were infected.    If we want to discuss the future costs of a given mid-
September state, even only for the following six months, we clearly need a much more 
realistic epidemic model.       
 
(3) Mid-September is a particularly bad time to have a large and growing epidemic.    
   
The argument here is that, even if we must suffer the same cumulative death total 
eventually, it would be better to postpone the next wave beyond the winter if possible.     
This goes beyond my expertise but seems plausible.    UK health care systems are reportedly 
very stretched over winter even in normal years.     Influenza and other respiratory illnesses 
are more prevalent over the winter months.   This takes up hospital space and resources.  
These illnesses, which have symptoms overlapping with those of COVID-19, also complicate 
self-diagnosis, and hence are likely to make testing slower and less complete, reducing the 
effectiveness of tracking, tracing, and quarantining. 
 
(4) The longer we can wait, the better chance we have of slowing, reducing and treating any 
second epidemic wave.       
 
This, I think, is the strongest argument.     There is considerable uncertainty about when, if 
ever, a widely effective vaccine will be available, but there must be some chance (even if 
small) that it might be soon enough to mitigate a second wave in winter 2020-1.      
 
There must also be some chance of better treatment options, even as soon as September 
2020.    The COVID-19 outbreak was declared a pandemic by the WHO in early March 2020.  
One might perhaps take this as a rough start date for global medical research focussing on 
COVID-19.    It was already known by June 2020 that treating specific subsets of patients 
with dexamethasone appears to be effective in reducing mortality [3 ]: it has been estimated 
that 4000-5000 COVID-19 deaths in the UK alone could have been avoided had this been 
known at the beginning of the epidemic [4].   This is 8-10% of the lives lost on Miles et al.’s 
estimates.   Medical discoveries are not linearly predictable, of course.    Still, we should not 
make policy while ignoring that they happen.    To get an idea of how to model for them, we 
could for example suppose, using this single data point, that one such treatment might be 
discovered every 3 months, take the lower (8%) figure, and assume that the treatments’ 
effectiveness is random and independent, so that with M such treatments available the 
mortality rate is (0.92)𝑀𝑀 of the rate at the start of the pandemic.    The mortality rates in 
mid-September 2020, mid-December 2020 and mid-March 2021 would then be reduced by 
factors of 0.92, 0.84 and 0.78.      
 
Testing is also becoming cheaper, swifter and more widely available; contact-tracing options 
are improving; knowledge about risky activities and locations is growing; mask-wearing and 
other ways of reducing transmission may be becoming more prevalent; citizens may be 
better informed and better able to self-protect.     There seems some optimism (which, if 
rational, implies some chance) that, combined with targeted interventions short of a full 
lockdown, these factors may – perhaps by mid-September -- allow a relatively low infection 
rate to be sustained, once such a rate is attained.     
 
2.2 Option value 
 
The last set of points (4) all have the same form: different states in mid-September may give us 
different options.  The expected value in lives or QALYs saved is uncertain, because this depend on 
uncertain future developments.     But it is irrational to assign them no value.     One has to take 
some view of the probabilities of favourable future developments and the magnitudes of their 
impacts.    Reasonable people can differ about the numbers, but it seems highly implausible that that 
there is negligible long-run value difference between the states of raging epidemic and near-
suppression in mid-September.     
 
I pressed Miles et al. on this point after reading the first draft of Ref. [1], and thank David Miles for a 
helpful and collegial discussion.     Clearly, though, I was not very persuasive, since their revised draft 
[1] adds (as far as I can see) only the following comments in response: 
 
“If it was obvious that starting from the first scenario three months ahead (continued lockdown) was 
obviously better than the scenarios where more people were infected (the three easing scenarios) 
then it would not be a complete analysis to just focus on costs and benefits over the first three 
months. But in fact it is not obvious that starting from lockdown three months ahead with low 
numbers infected is better. The numbers of people who had ever been infected would be lower than 
under the other scenarios and so the susceptible population would be greater so that the impact of 
then easing restrictions, in the absence of a vaccine, would be worse.”  
 
These comments seem, surprisingly, to ignore the probabilistic nature of option values.    Miles et al. 
seem to be arguing that it is not certain that starting from the first scenario in mid-September will 
turn out, in the long run, to produce fewer deaths than starting from (in particular) their most 
pessimistic ease scenario.   Indeed, it is not certain that starting from the first scenario is better than 
starting from the others.     It is possible that there will be no further developments in treatment, no 
more effective social or behavioural interventions, and no useful vaccine over the course of (say) the 
next 2-3 years, that we have no option better than allowing the epidemic to propagate through the 
UK population until we reach herd immunity, and that all the plausible epidemic curves starting from 
the various mid-September rates ultimately result in the same expected number of deaths (though 
this last is not a given even if epidemics propagate until herd immunity, because the epidemic 
overshoots may vary).     But to justify Miles et al.’s analysis, one needs to believe that there is no 
clear reason to prefer any of the scenarios.   This requires the extremely pessimistic view that the 
possibility of no positive developments is a near-certainty, i.e. that either the probabilities or the 
impacts of favourable developments are low enough to be neglected.     
 
In principle, one could try to improve the analysis by producing a full stochastic model of future 
interventions, estimating all the probabilities and impacts of favourable developments.     Another 
way of arriving at a cash figure would be to poll policymakers: if a mercenary genie offered to 
replace a state of raging epidemic in mid-September by a state of near suppression, how much 
should we be willing to pay?     Both methods are problematic: probability and impact estimates may 
not be very persuasive, and the alternative still effectively relies on policymakers using something 
like probability and impact estimates, if perhaps in a not fully consciously articulated mental model.     
But either seems preferable to simply ignoring the issue.     
 
2.3 Arbitrarily fixing time frames leads to inconsistent results     
 
Another way of seeing that there is something very wrong with Miles et al.’s methodology is to ask 
why they consider a fixed 13-week period, and whether the conclusions would be affected if 
different periods were considered.      Evidently, there is nothing magical about 13 weeks: lockdowns 
can be shorter, or longer.   Indeed, cycles of lockdown/release with periods much shorter than 13 
weeks have been proposed as serious policy options (e.g. [5]).    The UK had many options in mid-
June beyond a further 13-week lockdown or a 13-week release.      
 
Miles et al. do not say, but presumably believed that, whatever policy were adopted for the period 
from mid-June to mid-September, essentially the same analysis could be applied again in mid-
September to decide policy for the following 13 weeks.     Presumably they also believed that the 
same conclusions would necessarily follow, and that their fixed period analysis implies that 
lockdowns will always be more costly than the benefits warrant, although again this is not discussed 
in Ref. [1].    In fact, even this is not immediately clear, even if we restrict to the binary choice each 
quarter of lockdown or release.    In mid-September, Miles et al.’s third ease scenario produces 7572 
weekly deaths, increasing exponentially by a factor of 1.15 per week, implying about 300000 deaths 
over the following quarter.    A lockdown from mid-September in their model would reduce the 
weekly deaths exponentially by a factor of 0.7 per week, implying about 17500 deaths, so that 
easing from the quarter following mid-September implies about 282500 excess deaths.     If we take 
Miles et al.’s lowest estimate for the March-June lockdown costing £200bn, 10 QALY per death, and 
value a QALY at the NICE figure of £30,000, then the QALY costs are £84bn.   So, indeed, this calculus 
favours continued easing, but not by a large factor for this conservative case.   As Miles et al. discuss, 
there is a reasonable case for trebling the QALY value, and this would alter the conclusion.    
 
More importantly, though, if we consider repeated lockdown decisions at fixed intervals, there is no 
guarantee that the model and methodology will produce consistent answers.    This is easy to see in 
a toy model.      Let us assume that the cost of lockdown for N weeks is N times the cost for one 
week, which we call L.     Let us call the cost of a death C.   Suppose that we start with M deaths in 
week zero.     Suppose that lockdown reduces the deaths, multiplying by a factor 𝐹𝐹0 < 1  per week 
and easing increases them, multiplying by a factor 𝐹𝐹1 > 1  per week   Consider two strategies:  
(i) deciding week by week whether to lockdown for the following week,  
(ii) deciding at the start whether or not to lockdown for the following N weeks.   
 
Suppose that strategy (i) supports easing in week 1 (as it would with Miles et al.’s parameters).   In 
week 2, it supports continued easing so long as 
     𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐹𝐹1 (𝐹𝐹1 − 𝐹𝐹0 ) < 𝐿𝐿 .       (1)  
If it supports continued easing up to week (N-1), then in week N, it supports continued easing so 
long as  
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ( 𝐹𝐹1 )𝑁𝑁  (𝐹𝐹1 − 𝐹𝐹0 ) < 𝐿𝐿   .                                                        (2) 
 
Strategy (ii) supports easing for all N weeks so long as  
 
C M � 𝐹𝐹1 𝐹𝐹1𝑁𝑁−1𝐹𝐹1−1 − 𝐹𝐹0 𝐹𝐹0𝑁𝑁−1 𝐹𝐹0−1  � < 𝑁𝑁 𝐿𝐿 .                                             (3)  
 
If Equation (2) holds in week N then it holds in all previous weeks (and so implies equation (1)).   
It is easy to find parameters such that equation (2) tells us that a weekly decision tree will produce 
the outcome that we should ease every week during the N weeks, while equation (3) implies that, if 
we make a one-off decision at the start of the N weeks, we should lockdown throughout.      
For a simple example, take 𝐿𝐿 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ,  𝐹𝐹1 > 1  and 𝑁𝑁,𝐹𝐹0 such that 𝐹𝐹1𝑁𝑁  ( 𝐹𝐹1 − 𝐹𝐹0) <   1.   
 
This makes no sense.    We cannot trust a methodology whose policy advice depends on an arbitrary 
choice of time frame.     
 
 
 
 
3. Illness matters: the QALY costs of non-mortal COVID-19 
 
Another surprising lacuna in Miles et al.’s analysis is that, while they consider the loss of QALYs 
arising from COVID-19 deaths, they ignore the loss of quality of life caused by the illness itself and by 
the after-effects.    They also do not consider the possible loss of life expectancy for those who suffer 
serious COVID-19 illness and survive.     These costs are presently highly uncertain, but this is also 
true of the other costs and benefits that Miles et al. consider.    And many more people become 
seriously ill with COVID-19 than die of it, so it is certainly not immediately obvious that the illness 
costs are negligible compared to, or even smaller than, the mortality costs.    
 
According to the ZOE covid symptom study [6], most people recover from COVID-19 within two 
weeks, one in ten people may still have symptoms after three weeks, and some may suffer for 
months. 
 
One estimate [7] assigns a cost of 0.005 QALYs for a bout of influenza.    The course of COVID-19 
illness appears to be very variable.    Impressionistically, one might guess that it is on average 
significantly worse than flu even for those not hospitalized, and on average lasts longer than flu.    
Giving a factor of 2 for each of these would give a cost of 0.02 QALYs for an average bout of COVID-
19.       At a mortality rate of 0.6%, there are about 150 bouts of COVID-19 (costing a total of 3 
QALYs) for each death (for which Miles et al. assign a cost of 5-10 QALYs).      Although the illness 
cost thus estimated is smaller than the mortality costs, it is comparable, already suggesting that 
illness costs cannot be neglected in a quantitative analysis.      
 
Another approach might be to focus on hospitalization.    About 125000 COVID-19 patients were 
hospitalized in the UK up to mid-June, while there were about 40000 deaths (not all of which 
occurred in hospitals).     Although an illness requiring hospitalization presumably significantly 
decreases quality of life during hospitalization, and some COVID-19 survivors are hospitalized for 
lengthy periods, the average length of hospitalization is short (Ref. [8] suggests ~5 days outside 
China from early data).    Even assigning a quality of life of 0 during hospitalization, this gives a loss of 
only ~2000 QALYs from hospitalizations, compared to 200000-400000 from deaths.     Hospitalization 
QALY costs, per se, thus do seem to be relatively negligible.      
 
The QALY costs of COVID-19 after-effects are hard to estimate.   Lung scarring is reported to be 
common, even among cases where the symptoms experienced were not severe.   To what extent it 
may be expected to heal is uncertain.    Strokes, neuropathies, chronic fatigue, and mental health 
issues are all also reported.     The long-term prognosis for COVID-19 patients with some or all of 
these after-effects is not known.      
 
Producing even a ballpark estimate of these costs is thus very hard, but it is not hard to see that they 
might be significant.    One might expect that there are more patients with severe after-effects than 
there are deaths.     Say that 2% of COVID-19 patients had severe after-effects, diminishing their life 
quality by 0.2 for 5 years and their life expectancy by 2 years.  This would give (2/0.6) x 3 = 10 QALYs 
from this cohort for each death (for which, recall, Miles et al. assign a cost of 5-10 QALYs).      
 
All the figures in this section are crude guesses.    Taken at face value, they would suggest that the 
QALY cost of COVID-19 is double or more that assigned by Miles et al.    However, the numbers used 
here rely on thin data and guesswork.     My only clear conclusion is that, absent more detailed 
examination of the illness costs, Miles et al.’s quantitative estimates of QALY costs cannot be 
trusted, and nor can their conclusions.    Better data and better analyses of these questions are 
needed. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
It is very difficult to estimate the economic costs of lockdowns to date or to compare these against 
the benefits they have produced in avoiding COVID-19 deaths and illnesses.    It is also very difficult 
to estimate the costs lockdowns have produced in deaths and illnesses of other types.   There may 
also have been health benefits of lockdowns: these too are very difficult to estimate.    It is even 
harder to estimate the costs and benefits of future lockdown or easing policies.     The medical data 
about death and illness rates of COVID-19 are still uncertain, and the future prognoses for the more 
severely affected COVID-19 patients are very uncertain.    Any estimates are thus necessarily going to 
be rough and uncertain.   Comparisons of money and life are controversial, and there are reasonable 
arguments for assigning various values to a QALY.     
 
Miles et al. set out a framework which may be a useful starting point for such discussions, carefully 
acknowledging several, though not all, of these uncertainties.    The quantitative estimates they 
present lead them to suggest that, even with a value of QALY much higher than the NICE figure, the 
March-June lockdown in the UK was not, with hindsight, justifiable.    They suggest even more 
strongly that a continued lockdown cannot be justified, even if the alternative (which might plausibly 
be a worst-case scenario) is an epidemic exponentially growing from mid-June onwards.    They 
suggest that there is enough margin for error in their calculations that there seems little room to 
doubt their conclusions.  
 
As a starting point for academic discussion, giving a framework for others to improve, this is all 
valuable.     As policy advice, or a contribution to public debate, in its present form, it is highly 
irresponsible.     Their work neglects two key factors, each of which likely makes a large difference to 
their numbers, and which combine in a way that makes a further large difference, with all these 
effects adding to the case for lockdowns.      It is not at all clear that their conclusions would still be 
same if these factors were properly incorporated.      
 
One cannot usefully make lockdown policy by ignoring everything that will happen beyond a 3-
month horizon, unless one knows the world is going to be hit by an asteroid at that point.    (And if it 
is, the calculations and arguments would be very different.)      
 
Nor can one sensibly ignore the costs of COVID-19 illness and after-effects.   These may possibly be 
larger than the costs of COVID-19 deaths.     
 
This is not to say that either the original lockdown or continuing it beyond mid-June would 
necessarily be justified given a model that appropriately incorporates these factors.    It is beyond my 
scope to try to answer these questions here.    Building such a model needs informed insights into 
plausible future developments in COVID-19 treatment and prevention and into the long-term health 
effects of COVID-19.     I hope that others may be able to extend the work of Miles et al. to address 
these points and give more trustworthy (albeit very likely uncertain and conditional) answers.         
 
 
               
 
 
 
 
[1] Living with COVID-19: balancing costs against benefits in the face of the virus, D. Miles, M. 
Stedman, and A. Heald.   Version dated 26.6.20.     Available (at time of writing) at 
https://www.imperial.ac.uk/people/d.miles 
 
[2] Recent amendments to NICE’s value-based assessment of health technologies: implicitly 
inequitable?   Mike Paulden, Expert Review of Pharmacoeconomics & Outcomes Research 
Vol. 17, Issue 3, pp 239-242 (2017). 
 
[3] Effect of Dexamethasone in Hospitalized Patients with COVID-19: Preliminary Report 
P. Horby et al.    Medrxiv preprint available at https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.06.22.20137273  
 
[4] Estimate reported at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53061281 
 
[5] Chowdhury, R, et al. Dynamic interventions to control COVID-19 pandemic: a multivariate 
prediction modelling study comparing 16 worldwide countries. European Journal of Epidemiology; 20 
May 2020; DOI: 10.1007/s10654-020-00649-w 
 
[6] UK COVID-19 Symptom Study: report at https://covid.joinzoe.com/post/covid-long-term 
 
[7] Prosser LA, Bridges CB, Uyeki TM, et al. Health benefits, risks, and cost-effectiveness of influenza 
vaccination of children. Emerg Infect Dis. 2006;12(10):1548-1558. doi:10.3201/eid1210.051015   
Available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3290928/ 
 
[8] COVID-19 length of hospital stay: a systematic review and data synthesis. 
Eleanor M Rees et al.   Available at https://cmmid.github.io/topics/covid19/los-systematic-
review.html 
 
 
